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1  INTRODUCTION 
European  integration  is  expected  to  increase  competition  in  the  European 
markets. The common argument is that the White Paper's (CEC, 1985) reduction 
of trade barriers (physical, technical and fiscal) will intensify rivalry (Emerson 
et al.,  1988) through  two routes. The first (short-run) route involves increased 
potential competition and actual entry as a result of  reduced barriers. The second 
(long-run) route  implies increased cost efficiency after  a  process  of rationali- 
zation so as to exploit scale economies,  Both routes  are assumed to be to the 
Community's  benefit  as  cost  and  price  levels  may  fall. 1 This  conclusion  is 
reflected in, for instance, Schmitt's (1990) and Winters' (1991) recent overviews 
of the literature. This  paper  argues, however,  that  European  integration may 
achieve the opposite for two, closely related, reasons. 
Firstly, European  firms may start to collude EC-wide, rather than  on  a  per 
country  basis.  The  multimarket  collusion  theory  underlines  this  conjecture. 2 
Tacit collusion is usually related to interIaal conditions in a market. For instance, 
in a  market with a  small number  of incumbent firms each firm recognizes that 
its actions induce reactions by rivals. Fear for retaliation facilitates tacit collusion 
which, for example, raises prices. Many firms, however, are multimarket firms. 
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Mutual awareness and collusion may spill over to the other markets where they 
meet. This is the core idea of the multimarket collusion theory, which goes by 
names  such  as  mutual  forbearance  (Feinberg,  1985), spheres-of-influence 
(Scherer,  1980, pp. 340-342),  and live-and-let-live  philosophy (Kantarelis and 
Veendorp, 1988). Thus far the theory has only been tested on US data. We raise 
the issues for European integration. European integration will increase multi- 
market contact, which,  according to  the  multimarket collusion theory, may 
induce decreasing competition! This controversial prediction warrants an inter- 
esting theme in this theory. 
Secondly, the collusive nature of European product markets is facilitated by 
the increased incidence of cooperative R&D projects. For example, the 1980s 
witnessed  a  considerable  increase  in  the  number  of private  (that  is,  non- 
subsidized)  technology  alliances  (Hagedoorn  and  Schakenraad,  1993). In 
addition, the number of cooperative R&D projects financed by the EC sky- 
rocketed in the second half of the  1980s (Roscam Abbing and Schakenraad, 
t991). This means that firms not only face increasing multimarket contacts, but 
are  also  increasingly engaged in  multiproject encounters. This  second  trend 
fortifies  the  movement toward  EC-wide  collusive  arrangements, which  is  a 
further argument in favour of the observation that European integration may 
decrease, rather than increase, competition. 
To  sum up:  the  effects  of European integration come in three  steps.  The 
first-order effect is increased competition through potential rivalry and actual 
entry after lowering trade barriers. This is well-documented in the literature. The 
second-order effect -  rationalization -  can go  both ways: on the one  hand, 
increased cost efficiency  may bolster price  competition; on the  other  hand, 
increased  concentration  facilitates  oligopolistic  interaction.  The  third-order 
effect  is  decreased  competition through  multicontact collusion.  This  paper 
emphasizes the role of the third-order effect. In fact, the argument is that the 
second-order effect facilitates the sustainability of Community-wide collusive 
arrangements through oligopolistic behaviour in concentrated markets. Here the 
paper focuses on the interaction between joint R&D projects (in many cases 
EC supported) and product market conduct, and the intermediating role of the 
degree of concentration. So, the empirical question (and theoretical argument) 
really involve(s)  the relative importance of the first-,  second- and third-order 
effects. All this is not to say that the European Commission is unaware of the 
countervailing forces that derive from the  trends  toward increasing concen- 
tration and cooperation in Europe's product markets. Their awareness is mani- 
fest in the Commission's attempts to intensify anti-competition policies  at the 
EC-level. However, not only is the implementation of a tougher antitrust policy 
in the EC a difficult task to accomplish (The Economist, June 8, 1991, pp. 15-16), 
but also this policy may contradict with the Commission's intentions to stimulate 
European R&D (Jacquemin, 1988). 
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European integration will intensify competition. This is not to say that we assume 
that this prediction is fully beside the mark. However, a well-balanced judgment 
of  the expected impact of European integration requires an investigation of  forces 
pointing in either direction. By and large, the literature reflects a bias (exceptions 
are discussed in due course): the arguments presented are mainly in favour of 
predicting increased competition after the effectuation of the White Paper's 1992 
programme. This paper seeks to correct this bias by admittingly overemphasizing 
counterarguments. Which prediction is closest to the truth, is largely an empirical 
question. However, this paper offers hypotheses, complementing the ones that 
dominate the current literature, which may be helpful in guiding future research 
into  the  effects of European  integration on  competition. A  simple  model  is 
introduced to highlight the rationale of these hypotheses. A review of empirical 
work done in the Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and 
Technology (MERIT) and elsewhere presents data that underlie our conjectures. 
Since the aim of the paper is to guide future research, we do not claim to present 
clearcut evidence. 
Section 2  reviews  the  literature  on  (multicontact)  collusion  from  varying 
perspectives. First the theoretical results are summarized in propositions, and 
then, the major empirical results, if present, are listed. The review focuses on 
contributions from the literature on international trade, multimarket contact and 
joint R&D projects. The model in section 3 aims to illustrate the extension of 
multimarket collusion theory in the case where firms meet in joint R&D projects 
as well as in product markets. We derive three propositions which permit the 
theory to be applied to the case of European integration, which is subsequently 
done in Section 4. Section 4 identifies types of (product market and joint R&D) 
contact which may increase by European integration. Section 5 discusses the 
policy trade-offs the European Commission is facing, and offers an appraisal. 
Note in advance that the contribution in this paper is not so much the develop- 
ment of sophisticated new theoretical models or empirical tests, but rather the 
presentation of a thought experiment in the form of (i) reviewing three strands 
of literature, (ii) developing a preliminary model that integrates arguments from 
these bodies of literature and (iii) applying the propositions from the review and 
model to the case of European integration. This means that this paper is akin 
to an integrative review article. 
2 LITERATURE  ON MULTICONTACT  COLLUSION 
2.1  Three Streams 
Edwards (1955, p. 335) first discussed multimarket collusion: 'The interests of 
great enterprises are likely to touch at many points, and it would be possible for 
each to mobilize at any one of  these points a considerable aggregate of resources. 
The anticipated gain to such a concern from unmitigated competitive attack upon 
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with the possible loss from retaliatory action by that enterprise at many other 
points of contact  .... Hence there is an incentive to live and let live, to cultivate 
a  cooperative  spirit,  and  to  recognize  priorities  of interest  in  the  hope  of 
reciprocal  recognition.'  It  is,  ironically,  the  great  competitive  strength  of 
conglomerate (large and diversified) firms, plus their awareness of this, which 
prompts tacit collusion. Edwards (1955) goes on to argue that contact can arise 
in multiple  fields:  regional  markets,  product  markets,  vertical  stages  of pro- 
duction, and technological partnerships. 
Edwards' views received attention in the United States, especially because of 
their  consequences  for  antitrust  policy (Solomon,  1970;  Adams,  1974;  and 
Areeda and Turner,  1979). Conglomerate mergers  should be opposed if they 
increase multimarket  contact,  even if the  merger per se  does not change  the 
market power in a local market (Solomon, 1970, pp. 333-334). Recent theoreti- 
cal contributions which, more or less explicitly, deal with the issues raised by 
Edwards  (1955)  are  found  in  the  literature  on  international  trade  (sub- 
section 2.2), multimarket contact (subsection 2.3) and joint R&D projects (sub- 
section 2.4).  Although  each  literature  contributes  significantly  to  our  under- 
standing  of multicontact  collusion,  application  to  the  process  of European 
integration requires painting  a fuller  picture (subsection 2.5). Note that  appli- 
cations in the literature to European integration with a multimarket flavour are 
discussed in more detail in section 4. 
2.2  International Trade 
Recent literature on international trade emphasizes the role of imperfect compe- 
tition in general and oligopolistic interaction in particular (Krugman, 1989). The 
key argument is that intra-industry (and, for that matter, inter-country) trade can 
be explained,  in  a  setting  where  all  firms  are  equal, by pointing  to  strategic 
imperfect competition. For example, the arguments  on reciprocal dumping are 
a case in point (Brander and Krugman, 1983; Pinto, 1986; Calem, 1988; and Van 
Wegberg and Van Witteloostuijn, 1992). Jacquemin (1989) and Venables (1990), 
for example, raise this issue in the context of European integration.  Following 
the literature on industrial organization, this line of argument naturally extends 
to the issue  of collusion (Jacquemin  and  Slade,  1989). The key point is that 
reciprocal dumping may be the outcome of a prisoner's dilemma: only if both 
parties can agree to refrain from dumping, is joint profit maximized (Pinto, 1986). 
Three contributions to the international trade literature explicitly deal with the 
question of (implicit)  collusion: Davidson (1984),  Pinto (1986),  and Rotemberg 
and  Saloner (1989).  The three models are briefly discussed in turn. 
Davidson (1984) deals with the case where an importing country may impose 
tariffs on the foreign firms in order to enhance domestic welfare. The government 
has to take account of the effect of a tariff policy on the sustainability of collusive 
arrangements,  particularly cartels.  Collusion is associated with low quantities 
and high prices in the importing country. If both domestic and foreign firms meet MULTIMARKET AND MULTIPROJECT  COLLUSION  257 
in  an  infinitely  repeated  game  in  quantities  (standard  n-firm  Cournot  with 
segmented markets, perfect substitutes and constant returns to scale), the result 
is that '"small" tariffs lead to an industry structure more conducive to collusion 
while "large" tariffs make cartels less stable' (Davidson, 1984, p. 219). With small 
tariffs  there  is  much  to  gain  from  collusion  (Davidson,  1984, p. 220). An 
important  assumption in  Davidson's  (1984) model  is  that  entry (export)  is 
one-sided: the domestic firms  are not exporting into the foreign  firms' home 
market. 
Pinto (1986) analyzes a repeated game version of Brander and Krugman's 
(1983) reciprocal dumping model. The model is standard Cournot (segmented 
markets, perfect substitutes and constant returns to scale), with two firms having 
a home base in two different countries. The model deviates on two dimensions 
from Davidson (1984): competition is duopoly, and export can be two-sided. Not 
surprisingly, the result is that in a Cournot supergame context  joint maximization 
(that is,  implicit collusion) is  a  possible  equilibrium outcome of a  repeated 
prisoner's dilemma. The selected equilibrium critically depends on the (in)finite 
nature of  the horizon, the size of  the discount rate and the level of  transportation 
(or, for that matter, exporting) costs. This result is in accordance with the Folk 
Theorem (Tirole, 1988). To be precise, infinite repetition, a low discount rate and 
high transportation costs facilitate (implicit) collusion, where both firms decide 
not to export and stay domestic. 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) compare the effect of tariffs and quotas on 
limiting collusive conduct in an importing country where one domestic and one 
foreign firm are engaged in standard Bertrand competition (implying segmented 
markets, perfect substitutes and constant returns to scale) with one-sided export. 
So, the setting resembles Davidson (1984),  apart from the Bertrand duopoly 
nature of competition. Again, (implicit)  collusion is associated with low quan- 
tities and high prices (the monopoly  outcome). The result is that a single domestic 
producer facing a single foreign firm acts more competitively with quotas than 
with tariffs. If Cournot rather than Bertrand rivalry is assumed, larger quotas 
actually enhance collusion.  This result is in line with Davidson (1984), though 
in a different setting (quotas rather than tariffs). 
The main results of the international trade literature, keeping the imposed 
assumptions in mind, can be summarized in a proposition. 
PROPOSITION 1. In a two-country setting (implicit) collusion is facilitated by 
(A) infinite  repetition in conjunction with low discount rates, and (B) 'small' 
tariffs, 'large' quotas and large exporting costs with Cournot competition. 
Proposition 1A is the standard supergame result, whereas proposition 1B intro- 
duces international trade specifics. Note that the nature of  collusion in Davidson 
(1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) on the one hand and Pinto (1986) on 
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two-sided export, respectively: the former take collusion to be reflected in mono- 
poly-like conduct by two firms in the domestic market, whereas in the latter 
collusion appears as a true monopoly in both markets as the result of  the absence 
of trade. 
The essential feature of international trade is that competition is usually not 
restricted to  a  single  market, however.  The  current  state  of the  art  in  the 
international trade literature, apart from Pinto (1986), ignores  the impact of 
multimarket  contact  on  the  sustainability of (implicit)  collusion.  The  key 
mechanism driving the results are conversely repeated contacts over time in the 
context of supergames, rather than simultaneous contacts in time over markets. 
Although the repetition argument is  important, the influence of multimarket 
contact deserves further attention. Subsection 2.3 reviews the multimarket con- 
tact literature. Moreover, the argument is restricted to product market compe- 
tition and collusion.  Although attention to, for example, R&D rivalry is  not 
absent (Spencer and Brander, 1983; and Reitzes, 1991), the issue of  international 
R&D  cooperation is not modelled in the international trade literature.  Sub- 
section 2.4 therefore summarizes the literature on joint R&D projects. 
2.3  Multimarket  Contact 
The literature on multimarket contact consists  of two types. The theoretical 
models study conditions that facilitate multimarket collusion (Feinberg, 1984; 
Harrington, 1987; Kantarelis and Veendorp,  1988; Bernheim and Whinston, 
1990; Fung, 1991; and Kesteloot, 1992). The key argument is that punishment 
opportunities and profit potentials in a number of markets induce sustainability 
of collusive  arrangements in cases where cooperation could not be obtained 
otherwise. The empirical studies test the hypothesis that multimarket contact 
facilitates collusive conduct (Heggestad and Rhoades, 1978; Scott, 1982, 1991; 
Alexander, 1985; Rhoades and Heggestad, 1985; Feinberg, 1985; Feinberg and 
Sherman, 1985, 1988; and Gelfand and Spiller,  1987). By and large the hypo- 
thesis is  supported, particularly for concentrated industries. Both strands of 
literature are discussed in turn. For the sake of  brevity, only the main results are 
discussed. For details we refer to a recent and representative contribution in each 
strand (Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and Scott (1991), respectively). 
B  ernheim and Whinston (1990) model the credibility of  multimarket collusion 
in a repeated game framework. They show that in the case of symmetry of firms 
and markets multimarket collusion does not arise. The argument is that 'once 
a firm knows that it will be punished in every market, if it decides to cheat, it 
will do so in every market. This observation raises the possibility that increasing 
the number of markets over which firms have contact may simply proportion- 
ately raise  the  costs  and  benefits  of an  optimal  deviation'  (Bernheim  and 
Whinston, 1990, p. 3). Thus only in the case of asymmetry  multimarket collusion 
may arise in situations where, in its absence, single-market collusion would not 
occur  (that  is,  the  supergame  mechanism alone  does  not  suffice  to  sustain MULTIMARKET AND MULTIPROJECT COLLUSION  259 
single-market collusion).  Bernheim and Whinston's argument confirms econo- 
mist's intuition?'  4 Asymmetry may be due to, for example, different production 
costs. Symmetric advantages are a specific case, where each firm is most efficient 
in one particular product market. In the case of  cost differences, the firms collude 
by establishing spheres-of-influence.  For instance, in  the  case  of symmetric 
advantages, they shift  sales  toward the  more  efficient  firm in  each  market 
(Bernheim and Whinston, 1990, p. 13). 
The models of Feinberg (1984), Harrington (1987), Kantarelis and Veendorp 
(1988),  and  Kesteloot (1992) support  Bernheim  and  Whinston's  arguments. 
Firstly, Feinberg (1984) argues that each firm reacts to a  competitor's output 
expansion by increasing its own output levels in both the affected market as well 
as in any other market were both firms  compete. Each firm anticipates this 
aggressive behaviour by means ofintra- and cross-market conjectural variations. 
Feinberg shows in the two-market case that even if firms behave as standard 
Cournot duopolists, 'an expectation of retaliation in market 2 is  sufficient to 
induce restraint on the part of the two firms such that the monopoly level of 
output can be reached' (Feinberg, 1984, p. 246). The more aggressive the cross- 
market reactions (i.e.,  the higher the cross-market conjectural variations), the 
more  collusive  the  outcomes (i.e.,  the  higher the profit margins).  Secondly, 
Harrington (1987, p. 2) argues that firms can sustain the cooperative equilibrium 
in a finite horizon game by 'export[ing] collusion from one market to another 
when  the  cooperative  outcome  could  not  be  achieved  otherwise.'  Thirdly, 
Kantarelis and Veendorp (1988) is a dynamic counterpart of Feinberg (1984). In 
their model a demand shock may induce a firm to expand output in a market 
in  order  to  enhance profitability ('live'  constraint).  In  order  to  alleviate the 
adverse effect on its competitor the first firm may then contract its output in the 
other market ('let live' constraint). In doing so, firms may manage to approach 
the joint maximization outcome. Finally, Kesteloot (1992) shows that intro- 
ducing multimarket spillovers,  particularly demand or cost linkages between 
markets,  in  Bernheim  and  Whinston's  (1990)  framework does  matter.  For 
example,  her  model  reveals  that  interfirm  scope  advantages  facilitate  tacit 
cooperation. Her conclusion is that 'in order for Bernheim and Whinston (1990) 
to obtain the irrelevance result: multimarket contact will not affect cooperative 
3  The intuition in the strategic management literature on multimarket competition is that asym- 
metries offer scope for retaliation. Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985, p. 87) summarize this point by 
arguing that '[t]he underlying principle is: attack your competitor's profit producer with your loser. 
By forcing your competitor to overinvest in his profit producer and underinvest in his high potential 
'question mark,' you are able to gain a major advantage in a high-growth market.' 
4  Although Feinberg's (1984) model is symmetric, his review of unpublished literature acknow- 
ledges asymmetry: 'reactions in secondary markets may often be seen as a more credible threat than 
direct retaliation against rivals;  intuitively, price-reducing threats by a firm across markets may be 
seen as less costly (hence more credible), as they put only a fraction of that firm's own sales at 
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opportunities if additionally there are no j oint (dis)economies, due to demand (or 
cost) linkages between markets' (Kesteloot,  1992, pp. 261-262). 
Empirical  multimarket  contact  research  seeks  to verify the  prediction  that 
multimarket contact facilitates collusive conduct. The evidence supports, though 
inconclusive, the multimarket hypothesis. Broadly speaking, the studies  corre- 
late a proxy of the intensity ofmultimarket contact with data on conduct (market 
share  or profitability). 5 An  early example  is  Heggestad  and  Rhoades' (1978) 
study of the US banking industry in 1966-1972.  All but one study find a signifi- 
cant multimarket contact effect, the exception being Alexander's (1985) study of 
the market for short-term business loans in 69 local American banking regions 
in 1975. His explanation is that banks in the short-term business loans markets 
were  subject to  outside  competition. 6 The banks  may have practised  a  limit 
pricing strategy, thus forgoing profits (Alexander,  1985, p. 138). 7 This explana- 
tion is consistent with the fact that all studies, apart from Scott (1991), are US 
based with data from the  1960s  and  1970s. These markets may not have been 
subject to foreign, i.e.  European  and Asian, import competition. 
Four studies suggest that verification occurs in conjunction with intermediate 
concentration (Alexander,  1985) or high concentration (Scott,  1982,  1991; and 
Feinberg, 1985).  On the one hand, Alexander (1985, pp. 131 and 135) argues that 
concentration should neither be low (because too much competition suppresses 
collusion) nor high (for in that case tacit collusion occurs in the market anyway) 
if multimarket  collusion is to be facilitated in 69 local US banking markets for 
demand  deposits  in  1975.  On the  other  hand,  an  overall positive correlation 
between multimarket collusion and concentration appears to hold for 437 firms 
among the largest 1000  US manufacturers in  1974 (Scott,  1982) and 391  firms 
in US manufacturing in 1976  (Feinberg,  1985).  Scott (1991) re-examines Bain's 
(1956) sample of firms to support his hypothesis that 'Bain's effect- of concen- 
tration,  with  barriers  to  entry,  on profits  -  resulted  because  of multimarket 
contact  among the  firms in  his  sample' (Scott,  1991,  p. 228).  The results  are 
confirmed for an expanded sample of US manufacturing firms in 35 industries. 
The argument is that increased awareness of oligopolistic interdependence and 
larger probability of detection in a multimarket setting explain this result. 
5  One can raise doubts on the methods used. For example,  Heggestad  and Rhoades (1978) indicate 
collusion by the stability  of  dominant firms'  market shares. The price-cost  margin  seems  to be a better 
dependent variable to indicate collusion (Feinberg, 1985). As a proxy for the degree of multimarket 
contact, Heggestad and Rhoades (1978) use the number of contacts, i.e., markets where two firms 
meet. Other authors employ more sophisticated methods. Scott (1982, 1991) uses as a proxy the 
number of contacts going beyond a random number of contacts; Feinberg (1985) weights contacts 
by the sales level in the markets where retaliation may occur ('sales-at-risk'). 
6  The theoretical  literature does not explore  the effect  of  outsiders by simply  ignoring their influence, 
This implies the assumption that multimarket firms compete or collude in markets where entry by 
outsiders is blocked (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990, p. 4n). 
7  Following  Bernheim and Whinston (1990), (a)symmetry  may also have had an effect upon the 
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The  main results  of the  theoretical  and  empirical  studies  of multimarket 
contact can, by and large, be summarized in a proposition, again keeping the 
imposed assumptions in mind. 
PROPOSITION 2. If internal conditions alone fail to sustain cooperative con- 
duct, multimarket contact facilitates collusion in markets where (A) firms and/or 
markets are asymmetric, (B) protection against outside competition is signifi- 
cant, and (C) concentration is intermediate or high. 
The key point is that the multimarket contact studies complement the literature 
on single-market collusion by arguing that firms meeting in many markets can 
benefit from additional instruments to punish (and detect) firms defecting from 
the  cooperative outcome. That  is,  apart  from the  well-documented internal 
market  conditions  (such  as  high  concentration,  infinite  horizons  and  easy 
detection),  multimarket  contacts  facilitate  the  sustainability of cooperative 
outcomes. Note, moreover, that proposition 1B may be interpreted as a specific 
case of proposition 2A, since  tariffs, quotas and exporting costs introduce an 
asymmetry in favour of domestic firms  (though tariffs and quotas  are as yet 
largely analyzed in a setting with one-sided export). 
The literature on multimarket contact recognizes the fact that both product 
and nonproduct market meetings can increase the sustainability of collusive 
arrangements. This is, for example, clear from Edwards' (1955, p. 344) original 
formulation: 'technological partnerships tend to grow into complex systems of 
mutual  accomodation  among  large  business  enterprises,  within  which  the 
permissable sphere of activity of each enterprise is defined with ever-increasing 
precision as one agreement after another establishes a boundary, or a mutually 
satisfactory  joint occupancy, between that enterprise and some other enterprise 
with reference to additional products  and additional markets.' However, the 
theoretical models and empirical studies in the multimarket contact literature 
focus on product market meetings and collusion in particular.  Subsection 2.4 
reviews the literature on an important instance of contacts outside the product 
markets which relates to Edwards' reference to technological partnerships:joint 
R&D projects. 
2.4 Joint R&D Projects 
The issue of joint R&D is in the current context interesting for at least two 
reasons: firstly,  joint R&D is an important type of  contact; and, secondly, R&D 
(and its output, innovation) is central in the discussion of the welfare features 
of economies in general and European integration in particular (section 4). 8 The 
8  This paper's restriction to joint R&D ventures does not imply that other areas where firms may 
meet, are not relevant.  Space limitations dictate this  choice, however. Two other examples of 
interesting contact points are cooperative arrangements with other motives than R&D (see, for 
instance, Kwoka (1992) on production joint ventures) and cross-ownership networks (a  recent 
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economic  literature  on  joint  R&D  activity,  particularly  from  a  theoretical 
perspective, is starting to be developed (Jorde and Teece, 1990, p. 79). Much of 
the existing literature is inspired by perspectives from, for instance, organization 
studies or  strategic management.  The  literature  on  the internal  processes of 
innovation  (Jorde  and  Teece,  1990)  and  the  (dis)advantages  of cooperative 
strategies (Contractor and Lorange, 1988) are worth mentioning. 9 A number of 
contributions to the economic theory of joint R&D activity are Ordover and 
WiUig (1985), Grossman  and  Shapiro (1986), Katz (1986), D'Aspremont  and 
Jacquemin (1988), Wu and DeBondt (1991),  Baumol (1992) and Bhattacharya, 
Glazer and Sappington (1992). Jacquemin (1988) raises the issue in the context 
of European integration. The discussion in this paper is largely restricted to these 
contributions. For the sake of brevity, Katz' (1986) analysis is taken as the point 
of departure. 
Katz (1986) studies R&D cost sharing and cooperation in joint R&D projects. 
Firms in an industry may (or may not) choose to take part in the joint project. 
Cost  sharing  means  that  each  firm  has  its  R&D  activity subsidized  by the 
partners in the joint project. Crucial determinants of the incentives to cooperate 
are the size of inter-firm R&D spillovers (pre-introduction rivalry) and the nature 
of product market conduct (post-introduction competition). On the one hand, 
cooperation implies that the outcome of R&D spills over to the partners. R&D 
is  a joint good, so that  partners  have the opportunity to free-ride by under- 
investing in R&D and benefitting from the partners' activities. To counter this 
incentive to underinvest the cost-sharing rule provides an overinvestment incen- 
tive, as partners subsidize part of a firm's R&D effort. On the other hand, the 
incentive to join an R&D project decreases with the intensity of product market 
rivalry. The end result is that both R&D cooperation by firms not competing in 
the product market  and cooperation in basic research with  significant  R&D 
spillovers raise the effective R&D level, which in turn increases welfare; con- 
versely, both R&D cooperation by competitors in the product market and R&D 
cooperation in development activities with insignificant  R&D spillovers lower 
effective R&D and welfare. 
The arguments of Ordover and Willig (1985) and D'Aspremont and Jacquemin 
(1988) confirm Katz' (1986) results in a duopoly context, whereas Wu and De 
Bondt (1991)  analyze  R&D  cartel  stability in  an  n-firm  context.  Moreover, 
Ordover  and Willig  (1985),  Grossman  and  Shapiro  (1986), Jorde  and  Teece 
(1990),  and Baumol (1992) apply the literature's reasoning to assess guidelines 
for (American) antitrust policy. By and large, their argument is that increased 
Willingness to permit firms to engage in joint R&D projects is to be advised, 
conditional upon an evaluation of both key determinants  of R&D incentives 
(pre- and post-introduction rivalry) and their impact on welfare. For example, 
9  Particularly  popular is the application of  transaction cost reasoning  to issues ofinterorganization- 
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Grossman and  Shapiro (1986, pp. 333-334) argue that 'the first step requires 
definition of the relevant research and product markets, and assessment of the 
market  power of the  venture  participants  in  these  markets.  Any  bona  fide 
research joint venture among firms having little or no power in either market 
should be promptly approved. If the parents to the proposed venture do have 
significant  power in either the upstream, research market, or the downstream, 
product market,  then  the  second step in  our procedure is invoked  ....  When 
appropriability  problems  are  substantial,  as  they  are  likely  to  be  for  basic 
research activities ... the venture should be sanctioned.' 
Bhattacharya, Glazer and S appington (1992) argue that the negative incentive 
to join R&D efforts from intense post-introduction competition in the product 
market can be neutralized  by imposing specific licensing arrangements.  Their 
model is a three-staged game: the focus is on designing licensing mechanisms that 
credibly induce firms to share R&D-related knowledge in the first stage, being 
followed by noncooperative R&D behaviour in the second stage and Bertrand 
competition in the product market in the third stage. The result is that licensing 
mechanisms  which lower the intensity of post-introduction rivalry -  either by 
controlling entry into the R&D race or by making licensing fees contingent upon 
realized  product  market  profit  -  prove  to  be  able  to  stimulate  information 
sharing.  Put this way, the results of Bhattacharya, Glazer and S appington (1992) 
are in accordance with earlier contributions to the joint R&D literature. 
The  main  results  of the  literature  on  the  economic theory  of joint  R&D 
projects is summarized in proposition 3 (with the usual disclaimer involving the 
assumptions imposed). 
PROPOSITION 3. Joint R&D projects are facilitated by (A) large inter-firm 
R&D spillovers (a high intensity ofpre-introduction rivalry), and (B) imperfectly 
competitive product market conduct (a low intensity of post-introduction com- 
petition). 
So, the sustainability of  joint R&D projects is promoted by imperfectly competi- 
tive conduct in  the product market.  This  observation provides  a  link  to the 
literature on collusion in international trade and multimarket contact. However, 
as yet literature  has  not explored this  connection.  To be precise, apart  from 
Bhattacharya,  Glazer and  Sappington  (1992) the models take the intensity of 
product market rivalry to be exogenous, and  all models ignore the impact of 
multimarket contacts. Subsection 2.5 introduces, though in a preliminary way, 
prominent elements feeding the connection between the three streams of litera- 
ture. 
2.5  Multidimensional  Contact 
The  literature  on  international  trade,  multimarket  contact  and  joint  R&D 
projects is clearly complementary. A brief characterization  of the contribution 
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(1)  The  international  trade  literature  studies  the  effect of changes  in  trade 
conditions -  particularly infinite  repetition, discount rates, transportation 
costs, quotas and tariffs -  to the sustainability of collusive conduct and the 
latter's impact on welfare (proposition 1). The models ignore the influence 
of horizontal multimarket contacts, in product markets, and vertical multi- 
project encounters, in joint R&D projects. 
(2)  The  multimarket  contact  literature  studies  the  impact  of multimarket 
encounters  on collusive conduct, and  traces  conditions  facilitating multi- 
market  collusion  -  firms'  and  markets'  asymmetry,  concentration  and 
outside protection (proposition 2). The literature does not, however, explicit- 
ly model the  particulars  of multicountry (international  trade)  and  multi- 
project (joint R&D) contacts. 
(3)  The  literature  on joint  R&D  projects  focuses on the  incentives  for  and 
welfare implications  of joint  R&D  ventures.  Two key determinants  are 
identified -  pre-introduction  rivalry (inter-firm R&D spillovers) and post- 
introduction  competition  ((ira)perfectly  competitive  conduct  in  product 
markets) (proposition 3). The models, however, take no notice of the speci- 
fics of international  trade and multimarket contact. 
A common denominator of the three bodies of literature is the emphasis on the 
positive impact of the multiplication of the number of contact points -  either in 
periods, markets or projects -  on the incentives to collude. Firms  meeting in 
many periods, markets  and/or projects recognize their  increased interdepen- 
dencies: both the payoff  of collusion and the potential of  punishment is increased. 
A combination of the three contributions can be usefully applied to the process 
of European  integration:  European  integration  is  associated  with  reducing 
barriers to intra-Community trade (1), so increasing the number of multimarket 
contacts (2), and stimulating joint R&D projects (3). More on the application 
to European integration is included in section 4. First section 3 offers a prelimi- 
nary model that explores elements of the connection between the three types of 
literature:  the interaction between multimarket  contacts (in product markets) 
and multiproject encounters (in joint R&D projects) in a multiperiod context. 
3  MODEL OF COLLUSION 
3.1  Multiperiod, Multimarket  and Multiproject Contacts 
The sustainability of collusive arrangements  can be facilitated by an increased 
number of contacts. Increased contact may occur through three avenues. Firstly, 
in the well-documented supergames arguments multiperiod contacts increase the 
sustainability of collusion. Secondly, the theoretical and empirical literature on 
multimarket contact have explored the case of firms which, by meeting in several 
product markets, are able to sustain multimarket collusion where single-market 
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cussion by Edwards (1955) and Adams (1974) suggests that any form of contact 
may induce  collusion.  Firms  compete in  product markets, but  also  in  input 
markets. In fact, they may cooperate in developing technology (Edwards, 1955, 
p. 344). To be precise, Edwards suggests that R&D cooperation may spit1 over 
to  the  product  market.  This  argument  is  consistent  with  the  multimarket 
collusion thesis, if we widen its scope to a multicontact collusion theory which 
includes multiproject encounters. A joint R&D project provides firms with a 
contact point. This facilitates collusion by offering firms an additional means of 
retaliating defection. This section investigates the implications of an increased 
number  of contacts  along those  three  lines  -  multiperiod, multimarket  and 
multiproject -  for competition and collusion. 
The key argument is that the first-, second- and third-order effects of European 
integration on competition are interconnected. To facilitate exploring these inter- 
connections, this  section presents  an illustrative model. For the sake of con- 
venience, the model is kept simple. Although the model elements are coupled 
loosely, the  model  suffices to  reveal  the  economic intuitions relevant  in  the 
current context. Moreover, the analysis focuses primarily on the duopoly case, 
although remarks on the n-firm setting (n >  1, where n denotes the number of 
firms) are included when convenient. The model is used to derive three propo- 
sitions, which partly restate Propositions 1 to 3 in terms applicable to European 
integration. We use the model to suggest rather than to prove the propositions. 
Moreover, the model does not imply the claim that an institutionally correct 
description of a real-world market is pictured. To be precise, the model is limited 
to exploring four issues: firstly, subsection 3.2 links product market competition 
to R&D motives; secondly, subsection 3.3 indicates the crucial role of product 
market collusion; thirdly, subsection 3.4 applies the multicontact argument to 
multiproject encounters  in joint R&D  ventures;  and  fourthly, subsection 3.5 
briefly goes into the influence of outside (that is, non-European) competition. 
Section 3 is concluded subsection 3.6, which points to policy trade-offs. 
3.2  Product Market Competition and R&D Motives 
There are two firms, 1 and 2. For the sake of convenience, assume that a new 
product market is opened in period I. An alternative interpretation, not explicitly 
explored here, is that in period 1 a cost-reducing innovation is introduced. For 
simplicity reasons,  inter-firm R&D  spillovers  are  not included in  the model 
(proposition 3A). Demand evolves through time t, such that the monopoly profit 
n M changes with a constant factor g (> -  1).  So, 
:r  =  ~t~ 1/(1 + g),  (1) 
where t >  1 and n M is the first-period profit (a positive number). Note that g >  0 
indicates a declining market, whereas g <  0 represents growing demand. 
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technical uncertainty. The firms are identical. Their products are perfect substi- 
tutes. Firms have equal unit costs, and face no capacity constraints. Payoffs are 
as follows. If one firm enters the product market, it earns the monopoly profit 
~M. The present value P  of the flow of profits in period 0 equals 
pM =  ~. [rrM/( 1 + r)],  (2) 
where  e=[(l+r)(l+g)]/[(l+r)(l+g)-l].  If  r>O  and  g>O  (that  is, 
(1 + r)(1 + g) >  1), then e/(1 + r) >  O. Innovation is feasible  if the net profit is 
positive. That is, 
pM _ F >  0.  (3) 
If two firms enter, competition can be of two types: the firms compete either in 
prices (Bertrand) or in quantities (Cournot). With Bertrand competition each 
firm is willing to slightly underprice the competitor, thus capturing the entire 
market while forgoing a  small profit margin. Consumers  switch to the lowest- 
priced supplier. In case of a tie (equal prices), they buy from the suppliers on a 
fifty-fifty basis. Anticipating this, each firm realizes that the unique equilibrium 
prices are equal to the unit (marginal) costs, This is standard Bertrand com- 
petition. Thus their gross profits are zero. The present value, Pe (B for Bertrand 
competition),  likewise  equals  zero.  With  Cournot  competition  the  standard 
duopoly outcome (pC)  is  attained, implying that  ps = 0 <  pc  <  pM.  Table 1 
shows the payoff  matrix with net profits (pR, where R = B indicates Bertrand and 
R =  C Cournot). 
TABLE 1 -  PAYOFF MATRIX OF A SIMULTANEOUS R&D GAME 
Firm 2 
Innovate  Do not innovate 
Innovate  (pR _  F, P~ -  F)  (pM _  F, O) 
Firm 1 
Do not innovate  (0, pM _  F)  (pR, pR) 
Sc,  post-introduction  rivalry  in  the  product  market  is  associated  with  a 
Chicken  game  for  pM>F  and  pR= pB= 0  (Bertrand  competition)  or 
pc  _  F  <  0 <  pR = pc  <  pM _  F  (Cournot rivalry), implying that only a mono- 
poly  can  innovate  profitably  (condition(3)):  one  firm  can  make  profts 
(pM _  F>  0), but two firms cannot (pR _  F <  0). For the sake of brevity, except 
if indicated otherwise, we start from the Bertrand case. This means that -  in line 
with, for example, Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) -  defection from the coopera- 
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i,j =  1,2) by returning to the noncooperative Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in all 
periods t + x (x >  0). Note that the argument can be easily extended to the n-firm 
case: then pB _ F< 0 for any n >  1. 
There are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, where one firm enters the 
product market whilst the other does not. Thus a unique equilibrium outcome 
does not exist. A supply coordination failure may arise (Smith, 1981, p. 3) if both 
firms innovate or both rivals fail to do so. As we will see, this failure induces 
private or public coordination of the R&D effort. In the absence of coordination 
two noncooperative solutions exist. One is the maximin solution, which implies 
that each firm acts on the basis of a worst case scenario (Sherman and Willett, 
1967). Each firm, fearing that its rival will innovate, decides not to innovate. As 
a  result, the  new product  market is  not  served.  Both firms forgo the  profit 
opportunity offered by the new product market. 
A second solution to the coordination problem is a mixed equilibrium (Nti, 
1989). In the mixed equilibrium, each firm randomizes its strategy such that the 
other firm is indifferent about entry (that is, innovation). As a result the expected 
payoff is zero. Each firm decides to enter with a probability (pM _ F)/pM and 
to stay out with probability F/P  M. In this equilibrium there is a positive probabil- 
ity that no firm innovates, that either firm innovates, or that both rivals innovate. 
The firms (optimally) anticipate the possibility of a supply coordination failure. 
Both the maximin solution and the mixed equilibrium imply zero (expected) net 
profits. This is the noncooperative outcome. These results are in line with the 
well-documented literature on R&D rivalry, provided that a priori first-mover 
advantages are absent and innovation, if introduced by both firms, cannot be 
monopolized (Reinganum, 1989). Equivalently, equations (1) -  (3) link product 
market competition and R&D motives in accordance with the literature on joint 
R&D projects  (subsection 2.4,  proposition 3B).  Although the model is  simple 
and ignores numerous aspects of innovation (such as uncertain outcomes), it 
does bring out one genuine problem: the firms are unable to prevent a  supply 
coordination failure if they act noncooperatively. Next, we turn to cooperation. 
3.3  R&D Cooperation and Product Market Collusion 
For one, and ignoring other motives (Jorde and Teece, 1990), R&D cooperation 
is a form of cost sharing. Cost sharing alone, however, does not solve the above 
coordination problem. Say, the firms share the cost F on a fifty-fifty  basis. Both 
enter the product market. In the subsequent product market competition both 
rivals will try to steal consumers away from the other by price cutting (Bertrand 
competition).  Since  both  anticipate  this  post-introduction  competition,  they 
quote prices with zero gross profits. Thus the net profits are 0 -  F/2 (or, in the 
general case, pR  F/2), which is negative (if pR< F/2).  So, with post-intro- 
duction rivalry potentially being Bertrand, sustainability of  joint R&D requires 
product  market  collusion. This  is  proposition 3B.  This  result  implies  that  a 
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avoid the supply coordination problems of deterred and duplicated R&D) and 
static efficiency (i.e., competitive price rivalry in the product market). 
Product market collusion can be promoted in  at least two ways: repeated 
market contact over time and multimarket contact in time (which only adds an 
effect if repetition occurs in the first place). Firstly, infinitely repeated market 
contact over time facilitates the sustainability of collusive arrangements  (sub- 
section 2.2, proposition 1A). This is the well-established supergame explanation 
of(tacit) collusion. The argument runs as follows. Competitors cooperating in the 
product market require tacit collusion not to undercut each other's price. As a 
result, both firms can quote the monopoly price, p~. If consumers buy from the 
firms on a fifty-fifty  basis, each firm will earn gross profits of re~/2, with a present 
value of PM/2.  Since P~>  F  (feasibility condition (3)), PM/2 -  F/2 is positive. 
Thus cooperation does pay off. Product market collusion, however, suffers from 
the free-rider problem. 
If one firm quotes the monopoly price pM, the other firm may defect by quoting 
a price slightly below this price (say, pM _  e, where e is arbitrarily small). All 
consumers will turn to this supplier. Thus the defector earns approximately the 
full monopoly profit, rc  M. Cooperation requires the ability for each firm to punish 
a defector. This is possible if competition occurs on a regular basis. Defection 
can now be punished in the future, and can thus be deterred. If, say, firm 1 defects 
at period 1, it earns rc~ in the first period. In the subsequent periods the defector 
is  punished  by  firm 2,  which  suspends  the  cooperation.  They revert  to  the 
Bertrand equilibrium with zero profits and stay there forever.~~  Thus the present 
value in period 1 of future profit equals re1  ~. The present value in period 1 in the 
case of cooperation is (1 + r)PM/2. Firm 1 cooperates if(1 + r)PM/2 >  r~. That 
is, cooperation is the equilibrium outcome if 
~' (~/2)  >  rc~,  (4) 
which implies the condition that (1 + r)(1 + g) ~< 2. If r and g are sufficiently large 
(that is, if(1 + r)(1 + g) >  2), each firm will defect if the rival offers to cooperate. 
Anticipating this, neither is willing to cooperate in the first place, and both prefer 
the  Bertrand  price  competition  outcome.  Intuitively,  apart  from the  role  of 
infinite discounting (proposition  1A)  a  high rate  of market  decline g  invites 
defection by implying that the cost of punishment, in the sense of future profits 
forgone, is small relative to the current profit (Bernheim and Whinston,  1990, 
pp. 8-9)) 1 In the case of short-lived or rapidly declining markets collusion is 
10  Once  in a punishment  phase, the firms may try to escape  from  the grim  trigger  strategy to punish 
defection forever by renegotiating a return to cooperation (Tirole, 1988, p. 253). We ignore this 
complication. 
11  For example, if the monopoly  profit declines by more than a half each period (i.e,, if g/> 1), 
defection occurs for any discount rate, since then (1 + r)(1 + g) exceeds  2, irrespective  of the value 
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unlikely to  occur.  This  result  is  in  accordance  with  the  findings  of models 
studying the stability of collusion over the business cycle (for example, Rotem- 
berg and Saloner,  1986). 
Extension to the n-firm case is not trivial. Cooperation implies cost sharing 
among n firms: pB _  Fin <  0 for any n >  1. Equation (4) transforms into 
~. (rc~t/n) >  rc~  t  (4) 
Equation (4') implies that the well-documented result that increased concen- 
tration (decreased n) facilitates collusion is supported. The combined effect of 
g,  n,  r  and  s  gives  regimes  where  either  competition or  coordination is  the 
equilibrium outcome. Note, however, that this result may not hold. If not only 
the  benefit of cooperation (the  left-hand  side  of equation  (4'))  but  also  the 
(expected) payoff  of defection (the right-hand side of equation (4')) decreases in 
the number of firms, the  outcome is  not  obvious. The point is  that  with the 
number of potential cooperators (n) the number of expected defectors (d) may 
increase as well (d I> n). In equation (4') the payoffof  cheating (suppressing time 
indices)  then  is  n(d),  where  ~n/8d<  0  and  d=f(n)  with  Of/an >  0.  (Note, 
however, that the Nash equilibrium logic requires that only one firm defects.) 
A second route to cooperation is multimarket contact in time (subsection 2.3, 
proposition 2). Then, the interpretation is as follows. Initially, firm 1 and 2 have 
different home (country) markets. So, n M-A8 is the sum of the monopoly profits 
in both markets, market A being the home base of firm 1 and market B reflecting 
firm 2's home market: n M-AB =  n ~-A  +  zr  m-B. From the reciprocal dumping 
models  (subsection2.2,  particularly  Pinto  (1986)) we  know that  a  one-sided 
exporting strategy may induce a noncooperative two-sided dumping outcome if 
competition is in quantities: then competition is Cournot in both markets, which 
gives 2re c >  0 for both firms. Alternatively, the cooperative outcome gives either 
reciprocal trade with (implicit) collusion in both markets  -  ~M-A/2 + 7gM-B/2 
for both firms -  or the absence of trade -  rc  M-A and lr  M- 8 for the domestic firm 
in market A  and B, respectively. Multimarket contact theory predicts that the 
sustainability of collusive outcomes is facilitated by asymmetry (proposition 2A) 
and high concentration (proposition 2C). The second condition, high concen- 
tration, is satisfied, as we have only two firms competing for the market share. 
The first condition can be introduced by either assuming a positive transpor- 
tation cost, so that firms 1 and 2 face a cost advantage in their home markets 
A and B, or taking both markets to be of unequal size, so that one of both rivals 
can benefit from larger home demand. 
For the  sake of the  argument, take the following case:  exporting from the 
domestic to the foreign market requires a setup cost s >  0. It is s that introduces 
a 'symmetrical asymmetry,' since both firms face an identical cost disadvantage 
in  their  respective  export  markets.  Both  markets  are  symmetric:  that  is, 
rc  M-A =  lr  M-B =  zc  M. The nontrade solution (with lr  M for both firms) Pareto- 270  M. VAN WEGBERG, A. VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN AND M. ROSCAM ABBING 
dominates  the  collusive  market-sharing  arrangement  (with  n M-  s  for  both 
firms), as the first outcome spares the setup cost s. Cheating implies that one firm 
unilaterally decides to enter the rival's market, so capturing the domestic mono- 
poly profit in its home market (n M) plus the Cournot duopoly payoffminus setup 
cost in its entry market  (n c  -  s),  n M  +  n  c  -  s, leaving the 'honest' rival with 
domestic Cournot  duopoly profit,  n  c,  only. The  threat  of one-sided  entry is 
credible if n  c  > s. 12 In conjunction with infinite repetition two-market collusion 
maximally generates e. n i  for both firms, which is the discounted payoff of the 
repeated nontrade outcome. In this case both firms refrain from exporting, saving 
setup cost s. Reciprocal entry would give 2n c -  s for both firms.  Two-market 
collusion  Pareto-dominates  reciprocal  entry  in  the  one-shot  game  if 
hi>  2nc  _  s. Now two-market collusion is the equilibrium outcome if 
(5) 
Only if condition (5) is satisfied (and, of course, n  c  >  s  and  n M  >  2n c  -  s), are 
spheres-of-influence created: each firm monopolizes its home market, and saves 
the exporting  setup cost s. This  result resembles a  prediction  of multimarket 
contact theory (subsection 2.3, propositions 2A and 2C). For example, Bernheim 
and  Whinston  (1990, p. 13)  argue  that  '[t]he  fact  that  the  optimal  collusive 
outcome here involves the development of spheres of influence is not terribly 
surprising,  since  such  a  move  directly  raises  profits  for  the  firms.  What  is 
interesting, however, is that the development of spheres of influence also enables 
firms to collude more effectively on price.  By shifting  sales toward the more 
efficient firm in each of the two markets, profits on the equilibrium path rise, 
while the possible gains from deviation fall.' Moreover, note that the role of the 
exporting setup cost (s) in the multimarket  contact argument  (subsection 2.3, 
proposition 2A)  closely resembles  the  impact  of transportation  costs  in  the 
international  trade literature (subsection 2.3, proposition 1B): both large setup 
costs and large transportation costs facilitate the sustainability of international 
collusion. 
The  result  in  this  subsection  confirms  propositions 1A, 1B  (for  exporting 
costs), 2A, 2C and 3B, in particular.  Adding the positive influence of growing 
markets (assuming gA = gB = g), proposition 4 summarizes the results. 
PROPOSITION4.  Product  market  collusion  -  promoted  by  (A)  infinite 
discounting  (proposition 1A),  (B)  asymmetric  multimarket  contact  (proposi- 
tions 1B and 2A), and (C) growing markets - facilitates the sustainability ofjoint 
R&D (proposition 3B). 
12  With  Bertrand  competition  this  threat  is  not  credible,  as  entry  gives  a  negative  profit 
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Proposition 4  describes  the positive influence, under particular conditions, of 
multiproduct market  collusion on  the  sustainability of joint R&D.  The  next 
subsection deals with the opposite causality: how far does joint R&D facilitate 
product market collusion? 
3.4  R&D  Cooperation  on a  Regular Basis 
R&D cooperation may start for a number of reasons (Jorde and Teece, 1990). 
However, whatever the precise motivation of the firms, note that the European 
Commission promotes firms to cooperate in R&D on a regular basis (section 4). 
According to the multimarket and multiperiod collusion theory this widens the 
opportunities for sustainable cooperation. Firstly, if a  firm defects, the other 
partner can punish in some or all of their other current R&D projects. Secondly, 
punishment can occur by a refusal to start new R&D ventures with a defector 
in the future. So, the two main forces driving product market collusion, infinite 
repetition over time (subsection 2.2, proposition 1A)  and multiple contacts in 
time (subsection 2.3, proposition 2), are important in determining the stability of 
joint R&D projects as well. By suspending all cooperation, now and in the future, 
punishment is made more severe, and thus more effective. It may be argued that 
firms are unlikely to break off current R&D projects, because of their commit- 
ments to these projects. The model in this subsection illustrates this argument. 
For the sake of brevity, only the supergame argument is modeled explicitly. 
We model this intuition as follows. Say, every T (>~ 1) periods a new product 
appears that offers a profit opportunity to the two firms in one market. For the 
sake of convenience, assume that these opportunities are otherwise identical. 
One can think of overlapping generations of a  product, examples being new 
generations of chips and television screens. If the firms fail to cooperate, the 
expected value of these projects is negative (subsection 3.2). If  the firms succeed 
in  cooperating,  the  net  present  value  of a  project  at  time T,  2T,  3T, ...  is 
(pM _  F)/2. The net present value of a flow of such projects in period 0 equals 
[(pM _ F)/2] ￿9  [(1 + r)Z]/[(1  + r) ~- 1]. If firm 1 defects, it earns (approximately) 
the monopoly profit in period 1, 7Zl  ~. With Bertrand competition punishment by 
the other firm leads to zero profits for ever after. The net present value of this 
flow in period 1 is zc~. If firm 1 cooperates from period 1 onwards, its present 
value in period 1 is (1 + r)PM/2 for the current project, and [I[(P  M -  F)/2]  for 
future projects, where fl =  [(1 + r)/(1 + r) r-  1]. Firm 1 cooperates if 
~. (rt~/2) + ft. [(pM _ F)/2] >  rc~  t .  (6) 
(The reader may wish to transform equation (6) into the n-firm analog along the 
lines of the arguments in subsection 3.3). If(l + r)(1 + g) ~< 2, the left-hand side 
(LHS) exceeds the right-hand side (RHS) for any value of T [condition (4)]. Thus 
in this case the ability to start other joint R&D projects in the future makes no 
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condition (6)  allows for collusion in cases where a  single R&D project would 
induce defection. Whether collusion will indeed occur depends upon T, i.e.,  the 
lag between product innovations. The LHS decreases in T. Define 7-* such that 
the LHS equals the RHS. Since the LHS decreases in T, we can conclude that 
for 1 ~< T<~ 7* collusion is possible (i.e.,  LHS >  RHS). For T> 7* collusion is 
unsustainable.  Larger  lags  invite  defection  as  they shift  the  reward-for  co- 
operation further away into the future. If 7* <  1, collusion cannot be sustained 
for any T. 
We can interpret T as a product life cycle. The appearance of new product 
generations (introduced T periods apart) causes the older products to wither 
away (hence, g >  0). This leads to proposition 5. 
PROPOSITION 5.  Short product life cycles stimulate both R&D cooperation 
and product market collusion. 
Proposition 5 extends propositions 1 and 2 to the case were firms meet in R&D 
cooperation as well as in product markets. Proposition 5 may account for the fact 
that joint R&D projects, both private and public, appear in industries with short 
product life cycles)  -3 These are called core technologies,  because they areexpected 
to spawn many new products. The information technology industry is a case in 
point (Norton and Bass, 1992). Norton and Bass (1992) have a  sophisticated 
model  of  overlapping  product  generations  where  new  generations  reduce 
demand for previous ones. If European firms drop out now (for instance, if they 
fail to develop High Definition Television), they may be unable to catch up later. 
Proposition 5 points to an economic motive for cooperation in core technologies, 
rather than a technical one (for example, exchange of complementary technolo- 
gies) or a financial one (for instance, cost sharing). The prospect of a series of 
new products induces European firms both to cooperate in R&D and to collude 
in  the  product  markets.  So,  not  only does  (multi)product  market  collusion 
facilitate the  sustainability of joint R&D  projects  (proposition 4),  but  R&D 
cooperation also promotes the stability of (multi)product market collusion (pro- 
position 5): the causality is reciprocal. 
This intuition can be complemented by introducing the multicontact argument. 
Firms cooperating in multiple R&D programmes may subsequently proceed to 
divide markets (the 'boundary' option in Edwards' (1955, p. 344) quotation in 
subsection 2.3). This solution is feasible for multimarket firms. This may explain 
the large number of R&D cooperation programmes that exist between leading 
European firms in, for example, the information technology industry (Van Weg- 
berg and Van Witteloostuijn, 1993). Market-sharing arrangements abound. For 
13  There  is a literature that relates the incidence  and nature of (technology)  cooperative arrange- 
ments to life  cycle arguments,  two recent examples  being Auster (1992) and Cainarca,  Colombo and 
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example, Philips and Siemens cooperated in the MEGAbit project on the under- 
standing that  Philips would produce static RAM-chips and  Siemens dynamic 
RAM-chips. This reflects collusion by establishing spheres-of-influence in the 
product market through innovation division in the joint R&D project (propo- 
sition 4). The division of innovation within the joint R&D venture may well be 
(partly) based on asymmetric capabilities of the partners  (proposition 2A). To 
summarize:  multiproduct  market  contacts  (in  and  over  time)  reinforce  the 
positive influence of multi R&D project encounters (in  and over time) on the 
sustainability of collusive arrangements in both product and research markets, 
and vice versa. 
3.5  Competition by Non-European Firms 
Proposition 2B points to the influence of outside competition on cooperation. In 
the European context this  translates  in the hypothesis that  the prospects for 
European integration  depend crucially on the impact of non-European  firms' 
strategies.  We will  explore this  effect indirectly  with  reference  to  the  above 
models. Firstly, take the case where the non-European firms imitate European 
firms.  Following a  European  innovation  in period T, the non-European  firms 
build up market share gradually by expanding low-cost production processes. 
The quicker they do so, the faster they erode the profit potential of the European 
firms (that is, the higher g in condition (4)). Entry barriers, such as output quotas, 
may, however, deter their entry process. Thus rapid imitation  and low entry 
barriers in combination raise the rate of profitability decline (g), which facilitates 
defection. 
Secondly, non-European  firms  may also be innovators.  If innovation  is  a 
winner-takes-all (patent) game, at least within the European Community, entry 
by non-European innovators diminishes the number of successful innovations by 
European firms.  Easy entry by non-European innovators will increase the time 
lag (T) between successful hits for European firms. We have seen that larger lags 
invite defection, as they shift the reward for cooperation further into the future. 
Proposition 6 summarizes  the effects in both cases of entry by imitative  and 
innovative non-European firms. 
PROPOSITION 6. Low entry barriers to non-European firms prevent collusion 
by innovatory  European  firms  through  increasing  g  (proposition 4)  and  in- 
creasing T (proposition 5). 
Proposition 2B is in accordance with proposition 6. Entry by non-European firms 
improves the competitive functioning of product markets. The ensuing break- 
down of collusion may, however, prevent the European firms from innovating in 
the first place. If they go for the maximin solution, they do not innovate unless 
they expect to be able to cooperate in the product market.  So, easy (imitative) 
entry by non-European firms may not be in the best interest of the European 
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3.6 Policy Trade-offs for the Commission of the European  Community 
The  Commission  of the  European  Community  (CEC)  aims  at  improving 
European competitiveness and increasing R&D efforts. In terms of our model 
the CEC faces a political choice between two options. The first one seeks to 
induce  European  firms  to  coordinate  their  R&D  efforts. The CEC may use 
subsidies in order to facilitate these joint efforts. The R&D cooperation may, 
however, both  require  as  well  as  facilitate  product  market  collusion.  To  be 
consistent, therefore, the CEC would have to accept product market collusion 
(propositions 3 and 4). It may even face the need to facilitate product market and 
R&D collusion by increasing barriers to non-European entry (proposition 6). 
The second option entails that the CEC takes a firm anti-collusion stance. In 
order to suppress product market collusion the CEC may reduce entry barriers 
to (imitative) non-European firms. In this case product market competition may 
approach (static) efficiency, as prices fall toward marginal costs and profits move 
to zero. There is, however, one drawback. The CEC should subsidize the entire 
R&D effort (that  is, the outlay F)! These  two options  are, therefore, widely 
diverging. In core technologies where collusion is likely to occur (proposition 5) 
the former option (supporting product market collusion) will be easier to achieve, 
i.e.,  with  less  friction,  than  the  latter  (opposing  product  market  collusion). 
Moreover, dynamic efficiencies are more apparent in the associated industries. 
The policy dilemma the CEC is facing, being embodied in the trade-offbetween 
R&D project cooperation and product market competition, is recognized by the 
literature  on joint R&D projects (subsection 2.4)  in the context of American 
antitrust  law. Jacquemin  (1988) translates  the  results  of this  discussion into 
European terms. The trade-off is clear: on the one hand the 'situation involves 
extended collusion between partners,  resulting from their action in R&D and 
creating common policies at the product level' (Jacquemin, 1988, p. 557); on the 
other hand, 'a regulation of R&D cooperation excluding any cooperation at the 
level of final markets could discourage or destabilize many valuable agreements' 
(Jacquemin,  1988, p. 557).  In  fact,  the  CEC's  dilemma  resembles  the  R&D 
innovation-competition trade-off which patent agencies are facing (Cohen and 
Levin, 1989). A solution may be found in a procedure similar to the one Gross- 
man  and  Shapiro  (1986)  suggest in  the  American  context.  This  means  that 
specific joint R&D ventures have to be carefully evaluated as to their effect upon 
the  Community's  welfare,  broadly  defined.  The  arguments  presented  in 
sections 2 and 3 of this paper reveal the factors and mechanisms that have to be 
taken into account while executing such evaluations. 
4  EVIDENCE OF CONTACT 
4.1  Impact of Lower Barriers 
The CEC aims at increasing competition through the 1992 European integration 
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firms. Protection is reduced. Moreover, new product markets of strategic impor- 
tance, often in high technology areas, must be opened up for European firms. The 
first-order  effect of European  integration  is  well-documented (section 1):  the 
force  of potential  competition  and  actual  entry  will  increase  following  the 
reduction  of international  trade  barriers.  This  is  true  not  only for  intra-EC 
potential rivalry and actual entry, but also for outside competition. For example, 
in anticipation  of 1992 Japanese direct investments  in the EC, and  so actual 
entries  by Japanese  firms,  have  increased  considerably  (Heitger  and  Stehn, 
1990). The favourable welfare effect to the Community is, by and large, expected 
to be reinforced by the second-order competitive effect through  cost-reducing 
(and  subsequently,  price-reducing)  rationalization  processes  in  important 
European industries.  In fact, this line  of reasoning can plausibly be applied to 
argue that  European integration may also benefit outside firms and countries 
(Smith and Venables,  1991). 
However,  European  integration  measures  may  well  decrease  competition 
through  the  interaction  between the  second-  and  third-order  effect.  That  is, 
increasing concentration and increasing multimarket contact among European 
competitors may oppose the first-order effect. Indeed, the CEC is well aware of 
the danger implied by the decreasing rate of concentration which accompanies 
the rationalization processes. For example, in response to the recent acquisition 
and merger wave in Europe the Commission has intensified its antitrust policy 
(The Economist,  June 8,  1991,  pp. 15-16).  As  far  as  the  third-order  effect is 
concerned,  European  integration  measures  may  prompt  firms  to  collude. 
Sections 2  and 3 have  extensively argued  that  the  reinforcing  effect of both 
product market and joint R&D contacts -  and the facilitating role of increasing 
concentration  -  in  promoting  collusion may well be important.  This  section 
gathers tentative evidence increasing contacts at both product and R&D levels 
as  a  result of the process of European  integration.  Subsection 4.2  deals with 
multiple contacts in product markets.  Subsection 4.3  summarizes  evidence of 
contacts through technology alliances. 
4.2  Increased Multimarket Contact 
The European integration programme requires that protected markets, such as 
the  Italian  car market  and  national  markets  for government  orders,  will  be 
opened up. As firms will enter these markets, multimarket  contact increases. 
Completion of the internal market implies the very multiplication of multimarket 
contacts (Van Witteloostuijn and Van Wegberg, 1991). (Reciprocal) entry, both 
from inside and outside the EC, increases the number of markets in which firms 
operate  and meet. This  hypothesis is  supported by studies  of the  impact  on 
international trade of trade liberalizing measures in general and European inte- 
gration in particular (for example, Smith and Venables, 1988; Schmitt, 1990; and 
Winters, 1991). This means that the European integration programme may well 
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particular, in the form of (tacit) agreements regarding the sharing of markets, 
proposition 2) softens price competition in many markets. 
A second mechanism increasing multimarket contacts (and stimulating multi- 
market collusion) is the expected increase of concentration in many European 
industries. This second-order effect of European integration facilitates the force 
of the third-order effect (proposition 3C). Three contributions to the literature 
on European integration are worth mentioning by way of illustrating the argu- 
ment that concentration and multimarket contacts, and their influence on con- 
duct, are increasing: Sleuwaegen and Yamawaki (1988), Yamawaki et al. (1989), 
and Kay (1991). Sleuwaegen and Yamawaki (1988) and Yamawaki et al. (1989) 
show -  by comparing concentration indices in  1963 and  1978 for  Belgium, 
France, Italy, The Netherlands, West Germany and the Community as a whole 
-  that '[o]n average, concentration increased in each country separately and in 
the EEC as a group, but it grew more slowly at the EEC level than at any national 
level except The Netherlands  .... We found evidence on the influence of EEC- 
wide concentration margin for larger EEC countries -  West Germany, France, 
and Italy. These findings imply ... that the largest manufacturing corporations 
from West Germany, France and Italy may have recognized oligopolistic inter- 
dependence after the creation of the Common Market' (Yamawaki et al., 1989, 
pp. 131-132). Kay (1991) reports, on the basis of CEC's data, that the number 
of mergers and acquisitions in the EC rapidly rose from 155 in 1983 to 383 in 
1988. This too points to increased concentration. 
In fact, increasing concentration and multimarket contact are not only likely 
to raise the incidence of collusion in general (that is, both implicit and explicit), 
but may also be linked to the observation that European integration is associated 
with an increased incidence of explicit collusive product market arrangements. 
The increase in the number of explicit  collusive  arrangements in the  EC is 
well-documented in the literature. An important motive for cooperation empha- 
sized in the literature is efficiency gains.  The benefit of cooperation in (or, in 
anticipation of) a unified Europe is recognized by, for example, Buigues  and 
Jacquemin (1989) and Magee (1989). The former stipulate that '[c]o-operation 
arrangements, with or without the setting up of a joint venture, can also facilitate 
the exploitation of  new opportunities afforded by an open Internal Market. They 
promote synergies,  avoid costly duplication, make it possible to disseminate 
technological  information more widely, and reduce the time required to put a new 
product or process on the market; they also ensure that risks are more widely 
distributed among partners' (Buigues and Jacquemin, 1989, p. 63).  TM Kay (1991) 
provides data (from the CEC) on the increasing number of  joint ventures in the 
EC in the period 1983-1988: from 1983 to 1988 the number ofnewty established 
joint ventures in the EC increased from 68 in 1983 to 111  in 1988. 
14  The recent strategic re-orientation  in the market for financial  services reflects a telling  example 
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The fact is that the EC's integration programme provides structures, embed- 
ded in  Community law,  for intra-European cooperation (Slot  and  Van  der 
Woude, 1988). The CEC's White Paper (1985) proposes 23 measures that seek 
to embed intra-EC cooperation in European law. For example, the 'use of legal 
structures as the European Economic Interest Grouping ... make it possible to 
set up specifically European legal entities' (Buigues and Jacquemin, 1989, p. 66). 
Moreover, the CEC has installed research programmes for transnational cooper- 
ation projects (for example, ESPRIT and RACE) which stimulate setting up 
technology alliances within Europe. Subsection 4.3 presents data on the increas- 
ing number of worldwide technology alliances  in  general and in  Europe in 
particular. 
4.3  Contact through Technology Alliances 
An important and intense mode of contact is the strategic alliance.  A number 
of studies has demonstrated that the incidence of strategic alliances has in- 
creased considerably during, say, the past decade. Two examples of such studies 
are Hergert and Morris (1988)  and Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1993). The 
CATI-database of MERIT presented by Hagedoorn and Sehakenraad (1993) is 
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Figure  l -  Growth of newly established technology alliances  worldwide in 1980-1989. 
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established  technology  alliances  is  significant,  particularly  during  the  years 
1983-1989.  For  example,  in  1989  600  new  technology  alliances  have  been 
established. Note that alliances subsidized by the EC are excluded from the data. 
The distribution of technology alliances over industries is uneven. Particularly 
the incidence of alliances in the information technology (IT) industry is striking: 
about 41 ~o of the 4200 technology alliances in the CATI-databank originates in 
the IT-industry (with biotechnology ranking  second with about 20~o).  In fact, 
about 70~o of the technology alliances established in the 1980s is located in core 
technology industries.  The  data in  Figure 1 are  related  to  the  arguments  in 
sections 2 and 3 (particularly propositions 4 and 5): the trend is clearly toward 
an increasing number of contacts through technology alliances -  particularly in 
core technology industries with shortening product life cycles (Norton and Bass, 
1992) -  which may increase the sustainability of product market collusion. 
Apart  from  the  distribution  over industries,  the  origin  of the  partners  in 
technology alliances  is of interest.  Table 2  reports  the number of technology 
alliances per industry category for two periods (1980-1984  versus  1985-1989) 
differentiated by the home market of the partners. 
The  data  reveal that  the  absolute  and  relative  number  of intra-European 
alliances has increased from 1980-1984 to 1985-1989. In fact, the trend favours 
intrablock technology alliances  in general.  This  is  particularly  clear from the 
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Figure 2-  International distribution of technology alliances, in 1980-1984 and 1985-1989. 
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Particularly interesting is the observation that in the years after the publication 
of the  CEC's  White Paper (1985)  the  number  of technology alliances  with 
European  partners  has  increased  significantly.  For  example,  in  technology 
industries the number of technology alliances with European partners almost 
doubled from a total of 722 in 1980-1984 to a total of 1272 in 1985-1989. Again, 
this  relates  to  the  arguments  in  sections 2  and 3  (propositions 4  and 5)  by 
suggesting that European firms have increased their number of contacts in the 
second half  of  the 1980s which, according to the model, favours the sustainability 
of collusive arrangements in product markets. 
5 APPRAISAL 
The quality of the competitive process is  of major concern to the European 
Community. To the extent that this implies  a concern with competition in the 
product market, multimarket collusion will be opposed by the CEC. In this case 
the CEC faces a policy dilemma (subsection 3.6). Product market collusion, if  this 
is the outcome of multiple contacts, may be the price to pay for R&D cooper- 
ation. The latter has some good reasons, which warrant support and subsidi- 
zation (Jacquemin, 1988; and Jorde and Teece, 1990). Due to the public good 
character of knowledge, firms may underinvest in research activities  when they 
cannot captur  e the external benefits. Cooperation may help firms to internalize 
at least some of these externalities. Moreover, R&D coordination abates costly 
entry rivalry. Lack of coordination may instead lead to coordination failures if 
firms duplicate R&D or, anticipating this, do not start with R&D at all (sub- 
section 3.2). R&D  subsidization may overcome severe competition by third- 
country firms and quickly dissipating monopoly rents in high-technology in- 
dustries (proposition 5). 
Of course, there are global competitive factors that may moderate the factors 
facilitating the sustainability of (explicit or implicit) collusion within the EC. By 
way of illustration, three issues  are worth noting. Firstly, European product 
markets will continue to be competitive if third country (Asian, US) firms are 
allowed to continue operating in these markets. European alliances may in fact 
indicate intensified competition between European and non-European firms. For 
example,  '[t]he very threat that non-EC telecommunication companies might 
derive  the  major  benefit  from  an  integrated  European  telecommunications 
market may have prompted the recent unprecedented cooperation among the 
major European IT-telecommunications enterprises' (Thimm, 1988-1989, p: 67). 
Secondly, European firms with most R&D contacts also have many links with 
third-country firms. 15 Thus, if the former exclude the latter from the European 
15  To name but a few links: Philips with AT&T and Matsushita; ICL with Fujitsu and ITT; 
Siemens with Toshiba and Sony; Bull with Honeywell  and NEC; and Olivetti with Toshiba and 
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market, they may face retaliation in other markets (particularly Asian and/or US 
markets).  Moreover, non-Europeans  may  step  up  the  search  for  links  with 
European firms.  Magee (1989, p. 82) points out that, apart from acquisition, a 
'second approach open to the American Company with a European subsidiary 
is to seek an alliance with some company in a related industry for joint R&D 
or cross-marketing of products.' Moreover, this strategy can be undertaken so 
as to bypass the disadvantages of being an outsider. That is, '[o]ne response to 
Community preference [for EC firms]  is for a non-Community firm to establish 
a joint venture with a Community firm, thus obscuring national origins' (Peck, 
1989, p. 297).  This  means that global rather than  EC-collusion may have the 
future in particular  industries.  Thirdly, intra-European  collusion may support 
global competition. Cooperation provides European firms with financial means 
for investments without which they might be forced to exit from R&D-intensive 
product markets. In the global arena competition would diminish if European 
firms are eliminated. 
Where the game (competition or collusion; on country, EC or global basis?) 
will stabilize is an open question. This paper concludes, however, that there are 
sound theoretical and empirical arguments to believe that multimarket collusion 
may increase in post-1992 Europe. It seems meaningful, therefore, to recommend 
future  research  on  this  issue  in  the  context  of European  integration.  Both 
theoretical and empirical work may aim at systematically identifying conditions 
which further or impede multimarket collusion. From an empirical angle future 
research may focus on providing direct  evidence involving the hypotheses in 
section 3 by testing whether an increased number of R&D contacts goes hand 
in  hand  with  increased  product  market  collusion.  The  tentative  evidence 
reported in section 4 only indicates  an increased number of contacts, without 
providing any evidence on the consequences for product market competition. 
From a theoretical perspective we note that a crucial determinant that is ignored, 
with the notable exception of Kesteloot (1992),  in the literature on both multi- 
market or multiproject collusion (section 2) and in this paper's model (section 3), 
involves multimarket  spillovers (Bulow et al.,  1985; Van Witteloostuijn and Van 
Wegberg,  1992). For example,  Bernhein  and  Whinston,  1990, p. 2) explicitly 
exclude the  role  of such  spillovers  by stating  that  'to highlight  the  strategic 
linkages between markets, we assume away demand- and cost-based linkages 
that  motivated their  [Bnlow et aL's]  analysis.'  Since  R&D, with  and without 
contacts, more often than not is closely associated with multimarket spillovers 
(subsection 2.4), this lacuna is especially relevant in the current context. To be 
precise, following the lines of Kesteloot (1992),  intra-  and inter-firm  spillovers 
may be introduced in a multimarket framework where both explicit cooperation 
(through joint R&D ventures) and implicit collusion (in the form of tacit product 
market cooperation) may occur. Therefore, the argument and model presented 
in this paper only offer a first step by reviewing and comparing different, though 
related, strands of  literature, and elaborating on interconnections between multi- 282  M. VAN WEGBERG, A. VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN AND M. ROSCAM ABBING 
product  market  and  multi R&D  project  contacts  (in  and  over time) and  their 
reciprocal  influence  on the  sustainability  of (explicit and  implicit) collusion. 
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Summary 
MULTIMARKET AND MULTIPROJECT COLLUSION 
If firms meet in a number of markets, they may respond to an action in one market by reacting in 
another market. Fear for such retaliation may induce multimarket firms to collude across markets. 
The paper assesses available theoretical and empirical evidence on the multimarket collusion theory. 
Moreover, the paper suggests that the theory can be fruitfully  applied in the context of European 
integration. The focus is on collusion by firms which meet in product markets as well as in joint R&D 
projects.  A  mode!  develops three propositions, which shed  light on  the  subsequently provided 
(tentative) evidence on multidimensional contact in an integrating Europe. The discussion may serve 
as a framework for future research into both the theoretical and the empirical domain with appli- 
cations to the issue of European integration. 